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Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 19651 is designed to thwart ra-
cially discriminatory election procedures by requiring that the states and
subdivisions covered by the Act implement no change in election practice
until the Justice Department or the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia determines that the change is not discriminatory. As
enacted, the statute assigns sole responsibility to the Justice Department
for monitoring compliance with this submission requirement. In 1969, the
Supreme Court recognized a private right of action under section 5 that
allows private citizens to supplement Justice Department oversight.' This
private cause of action may be brought in a plaintiff's local district court
and allows a plaintiff to challenge an election procedure as a change lack-
ing "preclearance." 3 The purview of the local district court is limited; be-
cause the statute gives the Justice Department and the district court in
Washington exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a challenged elec-
tion procedure is discriminatory in purpose or effect, the Supreme Court
has restricted local district courts to the procedural question of whether
the practice was a change requiring federal approval.
In most private suits, the local district court will enjoin prospectively an
unprecleared procedure and require the voting district to use preexisting
election practice. However, when a private citizen brings a challenge after
an election has been held pursuant to an unprecleared procedure, the
court must also decide whether to grant retroactive relief by invalidating
the election.
While invalidation is an effective remedy, it is also attended by high
costs. Because local district courts are unable to consider the question of
discrimination in section 5 suits, their decisions may invalidate elections
that are not in any way discriminatory. This result is contrary to the pur-
l. Pub. L. No. 89-110, tit. I, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1973c (1982)).
2. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
3. Federal approval of a voting procedure is termed "preclearance." While not a statutory term, it
is widely used in the literature.
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poses of the Act, as well as the interests of both minority voters and cov-
ered jurisdictions.
This Note focuses on local federal courts' remedial decisions in post-
election, private challenges. It argues that these courts should be allowed
to reach the question of discrimination in resolving challenged elections so
that they can award appropriate relief. Central to this argument is the
assertion that invalidation under section 5 is warranted for discriminatory
elections but not for those in which the only established violation was a
failure to predear 4 Although changes in election procedure by covered
jurisdictions remain presumptively suspect, these jurisdictions should not
be subject to a different standard for the imposition of the invalidation
remedy than the rest of the country.5 Section 5 is an extraordinary provi-
sion designed to combat discrimination in voting; extraordinary remedies
thereunder should be linked to that purpose.
Section I of this Note describes the statutory scheme for preclearance
and the judicially created role of local district courts in section 5 enforce-
ment, and explains the significance of the invalidation remedy in section 5
suits. Section II reveals the disparate remedial approaches and irreconcila-
ble results in section 5 suits produced by the current limitation on local
district court jurisdiction. Section III proposes that local district courts be
allowed to consider the question of discrimination for the limited purpose
of informing their remedial decision regarding the specific election in
question. It does not suggest, however, that a district court's resolution of
the election immediately in dispute should relieve the voting district of its
responsibility to submit the change itself to the Justice Department for
approval. Thus, enlargement of local district court jurisdiction should
ameliorate the present difficulties of post-election challenges without com-
promising the statutory goal of uniform preclearance standards.
4. In 1986, a district court in Alabama invalidated a statewide election when a private citizen
brought a section 5 action to challenge illegal conduct by a candidate. The candidate, the state attor-
ney general, improperly encouraged cross-over voting by Republicans on the eve of the election. Hen-
derson v. Graddick, 641 F. Supp 1192 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (three-judge panel), appeal dismissed, 479
U.S. 1023 (1986). The attorney general's conduct was clearly politically motivated-polls had shown
that he would receive 84-88% of Republican cross-over votes, 641 F. Supp. at 1197-but the court
never found that cross-over voting would dilute the strength of minority votes. In fact, it regarded the
question of discrimination as beyond its inquiry. Id. at 1198. Nevertheless, the court ordered the state
Democratic Party not to certify the results of the election because the change could have affected the
outcome of the election. Id. at 1204. While the court's response was proper under section 5 as it is
presently enforced, this Note contends that invalidation without a showing of discrimination is not
justified by the Act's goal.
5. Invalidation is traditionally reserved for situations of egregious discrimination. See infra notes
24-27 and accompanying text.
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I. THE PRESENT OPERATION OF SECTION 5
A. The Statutory Preclearance Scheme
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act6 requires those electoral jurisdictions
with a history of discrimination, as defined by section 4 of the Act,7 to
obtain federal preclearance for all changes in voting practice or procedure
before implementation.' Federal preclearance takes the form of an admin-
istrative finding by the Attorney General or a declaratory judgment by the
D.C. District Court that the change has neither the purpose nor the effect
of discriminating against racial or certain language minorities.'
The declaratory judgment procedure for preclearance has rarely been
used; x0 instead, covered jurisdictions have preferred the more informal ad-
ministrative procedure." Covered jurisdictions must routinely submit all
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
7. Pub. L. No. 89-110, tit.1 §4, 79 Stat. 437, 438-39 (1969) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
1973b (1982)), triggers section 5 "coverage" of a given locality if the jurisdiction maintained a voter
eligibility test in the presidential elections of 1964, 1968, or 1972, and if voter registration or turnout
was less than 50% in the previous presidential election. The Act originally covered Alabama, Virginia,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, as well as one county in Arizona and Hawaii
and 39 counties in North Carolina. H.R. REP. No. 387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969). Coverage was
extended in 1975 to include jurisdictions with over five percent language minorities that, as of Novem-
ber 11, 1982, had election materials printed only in English, and in which less than 50% of the
eligible population voted in the 1972 election. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. Law No.
94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982)). For a list of jurisdictions covered by
section 5, see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS
24-27 (1981).
8. Jurisdictions "covered" by section 5 of the Act may not enact any changes in voting procedure
or qualifications different from those in effect on November 1, 1964, without securing federal ap-
proval that the proposed enactment "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
9. Id. The standard that has been applied in section 5 cases is "nonretrogression," 28 C.F.R. §
51.54 (1987); the change need not improve the minority voting situation but must not diminish minor-
ity voting strength. See e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) (creating retrogression test for
use under section 5); Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983) (as long as change not retrogres-
sive, it need not have any ameliorative effect).
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which applies nationally and guarantees fifteenth amendment
rights, was amended in 1982 to incorporate a standard prohibiting discriminatory results, Pub. L. No.
89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1972 (1982)), and some have
argued that section 5 should adopt the results test as well. See, e.g., Note, Getting Results Under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 139, 140 n.10 (1985) (section 5 preclearance stan-
dard should be results test that looks for social and institutional factors suggesting racial vote dilution).
The most recent Justice Department regulations conclude that a voting procedure that would dearly
violate section 2 should not receive preclearance, 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2) (1987), implying that the
results standard has been incorporated into section 5.
10. See Keady & Cochran, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Time for Revision, 69 Ky. L.J.
741, 750-54 (1981). As of 1981, only twenty cases had been filed in the District of Columbia from
which sixteen published opinions resulted. Id. at 753. By contrast, from 1965 to June 30, 1986, the
Justice Department reviewed 112,184 submissions; 12,646 submissions were made in the first six
months of 1986 alone. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS Div., COMPLETE LISTING OF
OBJECTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (Sept. 30, 1986).
For the sake of convenience, this Note will usually refer only to the Justice Department's
preclearance procedure.
11. See H. BALL, D. KRANE & T. LAUTH, COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE 88 (1982) (noting fre-
quent informal communications between local attorneys and Justice Department to facilitate
preclearance) [hereinafter H. BALL]. Although administrative preclearance began as a "Congressional
afterthought" created to resolve procedural uncertainty expeditiously, it became "a permanent and the
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changes1" and must provide the Justice Department's Voting Division
with all requested information regarding the voting procedure. The bur-
den of proof is on the submitting jurisdiction to show that the change is
free of discriminatory purpose or effect. 3 A letter of approval, or the At-
torney General's failure to object within the consideration period, 4
"preclears" the procedure and allows the jurisdiction to implement the
change. 5 An objection letter from the Attorney General blocks the
change.6
B. The Private Right of Action
The Act as passed gave the Justice Department sole responsibility for
monitoring compliance with the submission requirement.' By 1969, the
Supreme Court was convinced that Justice Department oversight alone
was insufficient, and in Allen v. State Board of Elections8 recognized a
private right of action under section 5.19 The Allen scheme allows private
plaintiffs to challenge in their local district courts changes covered by sec-
most important segment of the Voting Rights Act." Keady & Cochran, supra note 10, at 755-56.
12. Coverage has been extended to "changes" regarding reapportionment, e.g., Wise v. Lipscomb,
437 U.S. 535, 542 (1978); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 133 (1976); annexations, e.g., Rich-
mond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378-79 (1975); boundary alterations, e.g., Berry v. Doles, 400
U.S. 379, 388 (1971); changes from ward to at-large elections, e.g., id. at 394; location of polling
places, e.g., id. at 388; candidate qualifications, e.g., Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969); Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969); and alterations in procedure for casting write-in
ballots, e.g., id. at 570.
Some have argued that such extensive coverage exceeds the intentions of the statute's drafters and
amounts to harassment of covered jurisdictions. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S6157-58 (1970) (state-
ment of Sen. Dole) (most submissions involve inconsequential changes); 121 CONG. REC. S24,732
(1975) (enlargement of alcove near registrar's office required preclearance; hallway could not be wid-
ened for 60 days); id. at 24,733 (detailed list of covered changes); Keady & Cochran, supra note 10,
at 745 ("Indeed, there would seem to be few state actions that relate to the electoral process that
would not be subject to the proscriptions of section 5."); cf. Roman, Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act: The Formation of an Extraordinary Federal Remedy, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 111, 131 (1972) (rec-
ommending that certain changes be excluded from coverage).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
14. The statutory period for administrative consideration is 60 days, 42 U.S.C. 1973c (1982), but
the Justice Department regulations provide for an expedited proceeding under unusual circumstances.
28 C.F.R. § 51.34 (1987). If the Justice Department is not convinced of the procedure's acceptability
within the 60 day consideration period, it may request further information from the jurisdiction before
the 60 days have run. This extends the consideration period. See, e.g., Georgia v. United States, 411
U.S. 526 (1973) (department's request for further information tolls additional 60 day period).
15. The Attorney General's decision not to object is not subject to judicial review. Morris v. Gres-
sette, 432 U.S 491 (1977). Some have argued that this insulation jeopardizes minority rights. See, e.g.,
Binion, The Implementation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Retrospective on the Role of
Courts, 32 W. POL. Q. 154, 172 (1984) (Morris decision does not protect interest of racial minorities
because it preserves autonomy of Attorney General in face of discriminatory change).
16. An objection will be interposed not only if the Attorney General finds that the change is
discriminatory, but also if the Attorney General is unable to determine that the change is free of
discriminatory purpose or effect or if the evidence of discrimination is conflicting. 28 C.F.R. §
51.52(c) (1987).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
18. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
19. Id. at 557 (Attorney General's limited resources may render "[t]he guarantee of § 5 . . .an
empty promise unless the private citizen [is] allowed to seek judicial enforcement of the prohibition.").
These private actions are referred to as "coverage" suits.
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tion 5 but not precleared. Because the statute grants exclusive jurisdiction
over the discrimination question to the D.C. District Court or the Attor-
ney General, the Allen court denied local district courts jurisdiction to
determine whether challenged changes were discriminatory and limited
their authority to the question of whether the procedure was a change that
should have been predeared.2°
Ordinarily, the decision of the local district court in coverage suits is
straightforward: Any change in procedure that lacks the necessary
preclearance will be enjoined "unless or until" it is approved."1 The reme-
dial decision is much more significant, however, when private challenges
are brought after an election has been held pursuant to an unprecleared
change. In such cases, the validity of the election is necessarily called into
question and the court must decide whether nullification of the election is
warranted in addition to the prospective injunction. At the same time,
these courts lack jurisdiction to reach the issue of discrimination. They
thus cannot weigh the competing interests, outlined below, that should
inform their remedial decision.
C. Implications of the Invalidation Remedy
Federal invalidation of state elections is an equitable remedy that was
first employed in the reapportionment and civil rights cases of the
1960's." From the beginning, courts have regarded invalidation as clearly
within their equitable powers to fashion effective relief, but have acknowl-
edged that the remedy must be cautiously applied. Invalidation provides
sweeping remedy to a tainted election, 3 but does not come without costs
to the affected jurisdiction and its citizens. These costs include the signifi-
cant expenditure of additional time and resources required to conduct a
new election,24 a debilitating impact on the community's political
20. See id. at 559. The Allen Court also interpreted the statute to require a three-judge panel to
resolve these coverage suits. Id.
21. Id. at 561.
22. See, e.g., Starr, Federal Judicial Invalidation as a Remedy for Irregularities in State Elec-
tions, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1092 (1974) (tracing relatively recent development of invalidation remedy).
One of the first courts to employ this remedy was the Fifth Circuit in Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d
215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851 (1966); see also Gardner & Ebers, Federal Protections of
Individual Rights in Local Elections, 13 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 503, 504-05 (1980) (tracing federal
court entrance into state electoral processes).
23. Starr, supra note 22, at 1102-03; see also id. at 1095 ("Ordering a new election is, in some
respects, the ultimate judicial cure for illegalities which taint the political process.").
24. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 408 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black
describes invalidation in a section 5 challenge where no discrimination had been proven as
a 'shotgun' sanction, damaging all of the candidates and all of the people in [the jurisdiction].
Useless campaign expenses would have to be borne by both white and black candidates. And
the town, through property or sales taxes imposed on all citizens, black or white, rich or poor,
would have to collect tax money to pay the expenses of a new election.
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processes,2" and the antidemocratic effects of a rerun election.26 Accord-
ingly, courts and commentators have urged that the remedy be limited to
instances of substantial discrimination.
7
The Supreme Court recently expressed this same concern, requiring
that local district courts undertake an "equitable weighing process" before
an election is overturned in a section 5 challenge. 8 However, the Allen
scheme for private actions obstructs this remedial decision because local
district courts are not permitted to weigh the costs of invalidation against
the extent, or even the presence, of discrimination. Requiring courts to
resolve challenged elections without considering the presence of discrimi-
nation jeopardizes the interests of all citizens of a covered jurisdiction. On
the one hand, the electorate may be denied effective relief if the court is
unable to recognize a discriminatory situation and declines to overturn the
election; on the other hand, the jurisdiction and its citizens may suffer
unnecessarily the costs of a rerun election if a court invalidates an election
for a coverage violation that had no discriminatory effects. A survey of
post-election suits reveals that dissimilar remedial approaches invite these
incongruous results.
II. THE CURRENT RESOLUTION OF POST-ELECTION SUITS
Courts considering election challenges are faced with the choice of nul-
lifying the election or allowing it to stand." In section 5 suits, courts
either have made this decision with no information regarding the presence
25. See Note, State Candidacy: Requirements, Rights and Remedies, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 347,
352 (1967) (invalidation subjects state to "greatest disruption which judicial intervention can work.").
26.
[Dietrimental side effects which the invalidation remedy may have on the local political scene
are that incumbents cannot govern as vigorously as otherwise possible; that the costly election
machinery must be resuscitated for the rerun; that political candidates are forced to rejuvenate
moribund campaigns; and that the voters are asked to renew their interest in the same contest
with the same candidates.
Starr, supra note 22, at 1128 .
27. See, e.g., Taylor v. Monroe County Bd. of Supervisors, 421 F.2d 1038, 1042 (5th Cir. 1970)
(invalidation remedy "undesirable at best"); Hamer v. Ely, 410 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir.) (invalidation
"properly reserved for cases involving serious violations of voting rights"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 942
(1969); Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1967) (invalidation "[d]rastic, if not stagger-
ing" remedy); MacGuire v. Amos, 343 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (invalidation harsh); Perkins
v. Matthews, 336 F. Supp. 6, 9 (S.D. Miss.) (invalidation reserved for "gross and indefensible racially
discriminatory practices"), on remand from 400 U.S. 379 (1971); Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901,
905 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (invalidation should be limited to "the most extraordinary of circumstances"),
modified, 386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967); Gardner & Ebers, supra note 22, at 507 n.19 (blatant
violation of federally protected right such as racial discrimination necessary for federal court interven-
tion); Starr, supra note 22, at 1123 (only substantial misfeasance justifies imposition of costly invali-
dation remedy).
28. NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 183 n.36 (1985) (reversing
lower court judgment and remanding for remedial decision because district court had "never engaged
in the equitable weighing process necessary to determine whether failure to submit a covered change
for preclearance requires that an election be set aside").
29. Courts may also order interim relief, allowing the results of an election to stand until the
Attorney General has passed on the merits of the change. This "certification" alternative is discussed
infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
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of discrimination or have sought to ascertain the fairness of the election
indirectly or through extra-statutory considerations. As this Section indi-
cates, none of these approaches advances section 5's goal of preventing
discriminatory election procedures. Uninformed decisions are arbitrary,
while indirect attempts to detect discrimination fail to inform the courts'
decision adequately. The prerequisites to section 5 relief set up by some
district courts transgress the statutory scheme and may discourage private
suits. Thus, the present limitation on local district court jurisdiction inter-
feres with the fair resolution of election challenges and impedes accom-
plishment of the Act's goal-the elimination of voter discrimination.
A. Uninformed Decisions
Some courts have based their remedial decision solely on a jurisdiction's
failure to seek preclearance, without considering the election's fairness.
Courts declining to order retroactive relief at this juncture 0 may deny
minority voters effective relief because the challenged election procedure
may actually have been unconstitutionally discriminatory. 3 Conversely,
30. See MacGuire v. Amos, 343 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (court declined to void retroac-
tively election held pursuant to unprecleared procedure); United States v. Garner, 349 F. Supp. 1054
(N.D. Ga. 1972) (court did not overturn election results but allowed those elected to serve until next
municipal election even though Attorney General interposed objection); McGill v. Ryals, 253 F.
Supp. 374 (M.D. Ala.) (court declined to overturn election held pursuant to unprecleared procedure
because exigencies not extraordinary), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 19 (1966); Toombs v. Fortson, 241
F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1965) (court declined to void retroactively election held pursuant to un-
precleared procedure), modified, 275 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Ga.), affd 384 U.S. 210 (1966); see also
Crowell, Possible Surprises Ahead-Preclearance Under the 1965 Voting Rights Act, SCHOOL L.
BULL., Spring, 1986, at 1, 5 ("Generally, a court will not set aside elections held under the un-
precleared change but will enjoin only future enforcement of the change."); cf. Binion, supra note 15,
at 164-65 (discussing uncertainty regarding retroactive relief among district courts and hesitancy to
impose invalidation for changes not amenable to preclearance process).
31. See Roman, supra note 12, at 132 (prospective relief alone fails to fulfill congressional intent
regarding changes with substantial effect on election); Wallace, Runoff Primaries: Is There a Dis-
criminatorq Result?, 2 J.L. & POL 369, 395 (1985) (prospective relief alone falls to provide effective
relief to discriminatory election).
Plaintiffs could, of course, bring another suit under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the
Fifteenth Amendment to prove that the election was discriminatory and should be overturned. How-
ever, section 2 and fifteenth amendment suits place extensive burdens of proof on the plaintiff. See,
e.g., id. at 403 (section 2 suits not viable alternative for minority plaintiffs because plaintiff bears
burden of proof and because "such litigation is a complex, expensive and lengthy process which is
beyond the resources of many potential litigants"); cf. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. at 556
n.2 (inadequacy and difficulty for minority plaintiffs of suits under Fifteenth Amendment prompted
passage of Voting Rights Act). Thus, because the burden of disproving discrimination is on the de-
fendant jurisdiction in section 5 litigation, it is clearly to the plaintiff's advantage to resolve an election
in a section 5 suit. Furthermore, the Allen Court expressly provided that private section 5 challenges
should be brought in the local district court to spare private plaintiffs the cost of litigating in the
District of Columbia. Id. at 559-60; see also infra note 60. The value of the private right of action for
these plaintiffs is greatly reduced, however, if these local courts decline to grant fully effective relief
because they are unable to reach the election's merits. See Binion, supra note 15, at 164 ("In offering
only a declaratory judgment, the [District] Court left the political party essentially unpunished for
past illegal acts and unrestricted as to its immediate future actions. Not only did the Court fail to
rectify the existing situation of non-compliance with Section 5, but it has also put little premium on
future compliance.") (discussing MacGuire v. Amos, 343 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Ala. 1972)).
If only prospective injunctive relief were available, a jurisdiction's incentive to preclear when an
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other courts that consider only a jurisdiction's failure to preclear overturn
elections on that basis alone.32 Automatic invalidation is as undesirable as
a wholesale refusal to nullify elections in coverage suits. While routine
invalidation might deter deliberate failures to preclear,33 many changes in
election procedure are spontaneous occurrences not amenable to the
preclearance process34 or are innocuous changes with no discriminatory
purpose or effect."3 Also, given the costs imposed on the entire voting dis-
trict38 and the high standard for the imposition of invalidation in other
contexts, 37 the remedy is inappropriate when the change lacks discrimina-
election is imminent would be diminished-an effect most injurious if the change were indeed discrim-
inatory. The jurisdiction would suffer other consequences for failing to preclear the procedure, how-
ever, because the jurisdiction would be unable to "bail out" of section 5 coverage. "Bailout" refers to
exemption from section 5's submission requirement. This exemption is permanent, and depends on
the ability of the jurisdiction to show, inter alia, that it: (1) has not used a discriminatory device in
the electoral process, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(A) (1982); and (2) that it has complied fully with the
preclearance requirement, id. § 1973b(a)(1)(D), (E) (1982). For a complete listing of requirements
for bailout, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b), 96 Stat. 131,
131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1972b(a)(1-9) (1982)); see also Boyd & Markman, The 1982 Amend-
ments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative Histoy, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1374-75
(1983) (describing changes in bailout procedure to make bailout realistic possibility for covered
jurisdictions).
32. Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. La. 1968), exemplifies the per se approach to invali-
dation. In Brown, the court ordered a new election although it found that the officials acted in good
faith and the wrongdoing had no discernible effect on the election. For a discussion of the Brown
approach, see Starr, supra note 22, at 1122 (describing Brown as stating "the broadest possible rule
of invalidation" under section 5, standing for proposition that "[slo long as there exist possible dis-
criminatory actions by election officials, the election must be undone."); see also Henderson v. Grad-
dick, 641 F. Supp. 1192 (M.D. Ala.) (court invalidated election for unprecleared change without
showing of racial discrimination because court was barred from considering effect of change on elec-
tion), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023 (1986); United States v. Garner, 349 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D.
Ga. 1972) (assuming invalidation required whenever change clearly requiring federal approval imple-
mented without preclearance); United States v. Kemper County, No. 74-65(c) (S.D. Miss. Nov. 21,
1974) (court voided election in which county had converted from single-member to at-large districting
without obtaining section 5 preclearance); United States v. Twiggs County, No. 2825 (M.D. Ga. Jan.
31, 1973) (same).
Some commentators have supported the per se invalidation approach. See, e.g., Binion, supra note
15, at 164-65 ("failure to obtain the clearance should be sufficient grounds for judicial remedies
which disallow and void the practice albeit after it has occurred."); Derfner, Racial Discrimination
and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 577-78 (1973) (same); Roman, supra note 12, at 132
(suggesting section 5 be amended to require nullification of elections held pursuant to unprecleared
changes). But see Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 408-09 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (empha-
sizing injustice of imposing high costs of invalidation on jurisdiction when no discrimination estab-
lished); Starr, supra note 22, at 1123 (mechanical nature of per se rule violates equity's balancing of
countervailing considerations and risks unwise results due to lack of causal connection between illegal-
ity and election results).
33. "[Slalutary effects may indeed flow from.., consistent use of an invalidation order where the
particular wrongdoing takes place in a context of intransigent, obstinate refusals by the states or
localities fully to carry out responsibilities in a constitutionally appropriate way." Starr, supra note
22, at 1123.
34. See Binion, supra note 15, at 164-65 (rules governing political candidates often not formal
changes "enacted, then made operative," but rather are ad hoc and nonexistent prior to use, and thus
are not subject to prophylactic prevention by section 5).
35. Of the 112,184 submissions made to the Justice Department from 1965 to June 30, 1986,
only 1,404 changes were objected to by September 30, 1986. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL
RIGHTs DIv., supra note 10; see also supra note 12 (discussing extent of changes covered and noting
that virtually every change, no matter how ministerial, is covered).
36. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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tory purpose or effect. 8 Per se nullification for a failure to preclear denies
covered jurisdictions the equitable weighing of costs traditionally guiding
the application of the invalidation remedy. 9
B. Improper Prerequisites to Retroactive Relief
Some courts shrink from ordering a remedy based solely on their deter-
mination that a covered change was not precleared. Instead, they employ
extra-statutory tests for retroactive relief. A principal method is to con-
sider whether the change was one implemented over a previous Justice
Department objection.' This approach is helpful but not sufficient. Not
all changes are submitted,41 and changes that occur during an election, or
are effectuated by someone other than the jurisdiction's authorities, are
not amenable to the preclearance process.
4
Courts hearing section 5 actions have also imposed prerequisites that
controvert the clear congressional intent that covered voting districts, and
not private citizens, bear the burden of proof under section 5.4' For exam-
38. See, e.g., Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 408 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) ("In the
absence of affirmative proof of racial discrimination, I believe it would be an abuse of any remedial
discretion that may be vested in the federal judiciary to compel [the jurisdiction] to hold a new elec-
tion."); id. at 406 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Only after discrimination has been established does the
Federal Government have the power under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause to
interfere with the State's conduct of its own affairs."); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,
572 (1969) (new election should not be ordered because "the discriminatory purpose or effect of these
statutes, if any, has not been determined by any court"); see also Gardner & Ebers, supra note 22, at
507 n.19 ("It is not enough to attack the state scheme without having a factual situation which is
almost a blatant violation of federally protected rights."); MacCoon, The Enforcement of the
Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CAH. U.L. REv. 107,
124 (1979) (minor or inconsequential changes do not justify invalidation); Starr, supra note 22, at
1123 ("Even upon a finding of substantial misfeasance, the willingness of courts to enter summarily a
remedy sure to work significant hardship on the community is open to question absent [widespread
discriminatory conduct].").
39. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 22, at 1123 (per se invalidation obstructs equitable balancing and
is inappropriate against "isolated instances of misconduct in which officials acted in good faith or in
which forcing a rerun election would be an academic exercise because of the lack of causal connection
between the illegality and the election results").
40. See, e.g., United States v. Garner, 349 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (special election or-
dered where county switched to at-large districting despite Attorney General objection); United States
v. Meriwether County, No. 74-35N (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1974) (same); United States v. Twiggs
County, No. 2825 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 31, 1973) (special election ordered under similar circumstances).
In Allen, 393 U.S. at 571-72, the Court named as a relevant factor whether the jurisdiction could
reasonably be expected to have known that holding the election violated section 5. In Perkins, 400
U.S. at 396, the Court identified as other relevant factors: the nature of the changes complained of,
whether it was reasonably clear at the time of the election that the changes were covered by section 5,
and whether or not preclearance had been sought. For a discussion of prerequisites to retrospective
relief, see MacCoon, supra note 38, at 124.
41. See, e.g., H. BALL, supra note 11, at 86, 166-67.
42. See, e.g., Binion, supra note 15, at 164 ("But many changes in rules governing candidacies..
are not formal changes at all and as such are difficult to prevent through reliance on Section 5
because they do not exist until after they have occurred.") (emphasis in original); see also supra note
12.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982); see also MacCoon, supra note 38, at 124-26 (discussing impor-
tance of leaving burden of proof on defendant jurisdiction; criticizing criteria for retroactive relief as
imposing improper burdens of proof on plaintiff).
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ple, at least one court has attempted to discourage politically motivated
suits under the private right of action by requiring that plaintiffs make a
"good faith allegation" of racial discrimination as a minimal prerequisite
to the suit."" Similarly, courts have denied retroactive relief because of a
plaintiff's lack of pre-election diligence. 5 These inappropriate prerequi-
sites employed by courts unwilling to order invalidation based solely on
the failure to preclear would be obsolete if these courts could consider the
discrimination issue directly."'
C. The Certification Alternative
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a coverage determination
does not afford a district court access to sufficient information to resolve a
challenged election.47 In response, the Court has suggested a "certifica-
tion" 48 procedure in which the district court postpones its remedial deci-
sion until the jurisdiction can submit the change to the Justice
Department.49
44. See, e.g., Beatty v. Esposito, 439 F. Supp. 830 (E.D.N.Y.) (requiring good faith allegation of
racial discrimination to state a claim in section 5 enforcement action in order to prevent use of section
5 for purely political reasons), modified, 439 F. Supp. 830 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Gangemi v. Sclafani,
No. 74-0-1269 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1974) (same), affd, 506 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Mac-
Coon, supra note 38, at 121 (requirement of good faith allegation of racial discrimination apparently
an effort to prevent use of section 5 for political reasons when plaintiffs present no legitimate question
of discrimination against protected minorities).
45. See e.g., Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S 358 (1969); McGill v. Ryals, 253 F. Supp. 374 (M.D.
Ala.), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 19 (1966); cf. Tucker v. Burford, 603 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Miss.
1985) (preelection diligence not mandatory for post-election relief, but plaintiff's good faith must be
decided on case-by-case basis); Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 1966) (noting that
invalidation proper because "[tihis is not a case where an election is challenged for the first time after
it is held").
46. Some courts have disregarded the present statutory limits on their jurisdiction and considered
the issue of discrimination. Not surprisingly, these courts have been reversed for overreaching their
proper scope of review. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Supervisors, 429 U.S. 642 (1977) (revers-
ing district court for considering constitutional implications of violation); Perkins v. Matthews, 400
U.S. 379, 434 (1971) (district court exceeded permissible scope of review by considering merits of
change).
47. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 572 (1969); see also supra note 27 and
accompanying text (citing arguments that invalidation should be ordered only in face of discrimination
affecting outcome of election).
48. The term "certification" does not appear in the cases or literature discussing section 5 reme-
dies, but rather is a convenient label this Note uses to connote the Court's suggestion that district
courts cede the discrimination question to the Justice Department.
49. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 396-97 (1971) (Court first suggested that "in certain
circumstances... it might be appropriate to enter an order affording local officials an opportunity to
seek federal approval and ordering a new election only if local officials fail to do so or if the required
federal approval is not forthcoming."); cf. NAACP v. Hampton County, 470 U.S. 166 (1985) (order-
ing similar certification scheme); Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190 (1978) (ordering Perkins procedure).
It is not clear precisely how the Court intended this certification procedure to operate because it has
been formulated differently in the several cases setting it out. The Berry Court directed that if ap-
proval were granted, "the matter [would] be at an end," 438 U.S. at 193, language suggesting that the
election should stand. If the Attorney General objected to the change, however, the Berry Court said
only that the appellants could renew to the district court their request for new elections, id., implying
that invalidation would not be required, but would remain at the district court's discretion. Con-
versely, the Hampton County Court apparently intended that objection by the Attorney General
would mandate invalidation, 470 U.S. at 183 ("[Ilf approval is not forthcoming, the results of the ...
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Although some courts have adopted this certification procedure,5" it has
two serious drawbacks. First, the certification approach delays the reme-
dial decision. The administrative preclearance process invariably requires
the full sixty days or more,51 and although Justice Department regula-
tions allow the voting district to request an expedited procedure, a quick
turnaround is not guaranteed.5 In any event, a district court would not be
able to engage in the "equitable weighing process" of all relevant factors
required by the Supreme Court until the Attorney General had returned a
decision.
53
A second and more critical flaw in the certification scheme is its limited
value to a reviewing district court. Because the Attorney General's re-
sponse usually consists of little more than a yes or no answer, 54 certifica-
tion does not adequately inform a court's decision. The Justice Depart-
ment has acknowledged that the administrative process does not approach
the thoroughness of judicial fact-finding.55 Indeed, some courts and com-
election should be set aside."), while the Attorney General's approval would not "end the matter," as
in Berry, but would constitute only one of several factors influencing the district court's remedial
decision. 470 U.S. at 183 ("If, however, the Attorney General determines that the changes had no
discriminatory purpose or effect, the District Court should determine, in the exercise of its equitable
discretion, whether the results of the election may stand.").
Thus, the Supreme Court's conflicting directives leave doubt as to whether either objection or ap-
proval by the Attorney General necessitates a particular result or if the remedial decision remains
entirely at the district court's discretion. A second ambiguity is whether the certification procedure is
required for a suit involving a post-election challenge, or is merely available to the district court if it
desires the Justice Department's opinion. Perkins suggested certification in some circumstances, but
Hampton County implied that certification was required in post-election challenges, 470 U.S. at 183
n.36. If the certification procedure is not mandatory, it is still possible for the district court to remedy
elections blindly. To preclude that possibility, if courts are not allowed to rule on the question of
discrimination as urged here, Congress should at a minimum mandate a certification procedure for
post-election suits to avoid the blind invalidation or approval of elections.
50. See, e.g., Heggins v. City of Dallas, 469 F. Supp. 739 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (mem.) (enjoined
election results until Attorney General decision); United States v. Board of Comm'rs, No. 76-M-1086
(N.D. Ala. Feb. 27, 1979) (allowing post hoc submission of challenged procedure before final rem-
edy); United States v. Board of Trustees, No. SA-78-CA-84 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 1978) (same); see
also cases cited in MacCoon, supra note 38, at 122 n.109; id. at 122-23 (noting preference of some
district courts to enjoin results of election until final determination of section 5 claim on merits in
Justice Department).
51. See, e.g, Keady & Cochran, supra note 10, at 775 (decisions over 100 days late in 68% of
submissions).
52. See supra note 14.
53. See NAACP v. Hampton County Elections Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 183 n.36 (1985) ("[T]he
determination whether failure to submit the change requires that the election be set aside.... must be
made by the District Court, after the Attorney General has passed on the substantive nature of the
change."); see also Henderson v. Graddick, 641 F. Supp. 1192, 1201-02, 1203 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (the
word "preclearance" for submission of change after election is misnomer; under facts of this case, for
court to stay its hand until Attorney General has opportunity to study racial impact of change would
entail too much delay), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023 (1986).
54. See H. BALL, supra note 11, at 133 (once documents reporting voting change have been
processed, Chief of Voting Section mails letter to local governmental unit notifying it that U.S. Attor-
ney General either "does not interpose any objection" or "interposes an objection"); id. at 258-62
(reproducing sample Justice Department communication to submitting jurisdiction); see also Keady &
Cochran, supra note 10, at 784 n.197 (criticizing Attorney General's decisions not to preclear as
undocumented and unaccountable).
55.
Unlike court procedirigs, administrative review under Section 5-which is by statute limited
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mentators have questioned the accuracy and efficacy of the administrative
preclearance process in general."e Hence, while an indication from the
Attorney General of a change's discriminatory potential would certainly
aid the court's remedial decision, it does not supplant a district court's
own review of the full circumstances of the election.57 Despite the Voting
Rights Act's stated goal of eliminating discrimination in voting, there is
presently no satisfactory means by which local district courts can take dis-
crimination into account in ruling on elections challenged under section 5.
III. PROPOSED ROLE FOR LOCAL DISTRICT COURTS IN
POST-ELECTION CHALLENGES
Congress should amend section 5 to give local district courts resolving
post-election challenges jurisdiction to consider the issue of discrimination
once they have determined that the challenged procedure is covered by
section 5. The courts' remedial decisions should be made on an expedited
basis to minimize the costs of delay, and the burden of proof should re-
main on defendants. Although objections have been raised in the past to
an expanded role for local district courts, this narrow revision would en-
hance rather than undermine minority rights under section 5.
to 60 days upon receipt of all necessary information-does not include the kind of hearing
procedures that provide for the full presentation of evidence and rebuttal evidence by con-
testing parties and others interested in the proceedings. There is no formal record developed
with findings of fact and conclusions of law announced at the end by the Attorney General.
52 Fed. Reg. 486, 487 (1987) (commentary to proposed Subpart F, Procedures for the Administration
of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
56. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 205 n.17 (1980) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) ("[No senior officer in the Justice Department-much less the Attorney General-could make a
thoughtful, personal judgment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. Thus,
important decisions made on a democratic basis ... are finally judged by unidentifiable employees of
a federal bureaucracy, usually without anything resembling an evidentiary hearing.").
For a detailed account of the criticisms levelled against the efficacy of the administrative
preclearance process in Congress, see Keady & Cochran, supra note 10, at 754-59; see also id. at 756
(describing preclearance process as "fraught with difficulties which could not have been anticipated in
1965"); McClellan, Fiddling With the Constitution While Rome Burns: The Case Against the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 LA. L. REv. 5, 19, 28 (1981) (administrative preclearance unmanageable;
broad scope of section 5 has created "massive burden" on Justice Department).
Not only the efficacy, but also the accuracy of the Justice Department's preclearance procedures
has been questioned. See Keady & Cochran, supra note 10, at 773-75 ("paraprofessionals who pos-
sess neither demographic/statistical skills nor legal training" make the "initial (and normally upheld)
determinations with respect to whether the proposed change has a discriminatory purpose or effect");
see also Binion, supra note 15, at 173 ("[tlhe major problem facing the Civil Rights Division has
been the gathering of accurate information to insure that... it has had sufficient data for assessing
the legality of the submitted changes.").
The preclearance process itself should not be abandoned, see, e.g., Keady & Cochran, supra note
10, at 780 (recommending retention of modified preclearance procedure), but these well-documented
inadequacies in the administrative process support the argument made here that district courts could
better give equitable consideration to the discriminatory implications of a challenged election in an
expeditious hearing.
57. See, e.g., Keady & Cochran, supra note 10, at 758-59 (noting "the impropriety of vesting




A. Overcoming Past Objections to District Court Jurisdiction
This proposal answers the two objections that have been raised in the
past to allowing local district courts to reach the question of discrimina-
tion-the loss of centralized preclearance and a mistrust of Southern fed-
eral district judges.
First, members of Congress and commentators have insisted that en-
forcement of the preclearance process must be centralized to develop ex-
pertise in one decisionmaking body and to assure uniform application of
the provision." Allowing district courts to reach the issue of discrimina-
tion before deciding whether or not to overturn an election would not in-
terfere with the Justice Department's virtually exclusive control over
which procedures receive preclearance. 9 Because local district courts
would consider the presence and magnitude of discrimination in the elec-
tion for the sole purpose of fashioning an appropriate remedy, they would
not "preclear" any election procedure.60
A second, more sensitive impediment to expanding participation by lo-
cal district courts in the enforcement of section 5 stems from Congress'
original decision to direct all litigation under section 5 to the District of
Columbia: Congress suspected that federal district judges in the South
might undermine effective enforcement of the statute."1 Whether there re-
mains any continuing basis for this apprehension is certainly questiona-
ble. 2 Twenty three years have passed since the Voting Rights Act and its
58. See, e.g., Keady & Cochran, supra note 10, at 749-50 (uniformity of interpretation was prin-
cipal rationale for original decision to limit jurisdiction of section 5 declaratory judgment actions to
District of Columbia); id. at 750-51 (uniformity argument relied upon in 1970 and 1975 extensions
of the Act to maintain centralized jurisdiction).
59. The revision suggested by this Note involves only those changes challenged in a local district
court after an election has been held under the challenged procedure. Thus, local district courts would
never consider the merits of changes which have not yet affected an election. Rather, they would
enjoin those changes and direct voting districts to submit them for preclearance. See supra text accom-
panying note 21.
60. Also, while the District of Columbia court could rule on the issue of discrimination in elec-
tions challenged under section 5, limiting all litigation over the merits of the change to that court
curtails the effectiveness of the private right of action. The Allen Court directed that private actions be
brought in the local district court expressly to avoid forcing individual plaintiffs to travel to the Dis-
trict of Columbia to litigate.
[TIhe individual litigant will often not have sufficient resources to maintain an action easily
outside the district in which he resides, especially in cases where the individual litigant is
attacking a local city or county regulation. Thus, for the individual litigant, the District of
Columbia burden may be sufficient to preclude him from bringing suit.
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 559-60 (1969).
61. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REc. 16267 (1975) (Rep. Butler charging that centralized jurisdiction
not motivated by desire for expertise in District of Columbia but "political bias" against Southern
judges); id. at 16283 (Rep. Kindness claiming jurisdictional limits were insult to Southern judiciary);
see also, McClellan, supra note 56, at 77 (describing denial of jurisdiction to local district court
judges as "one of [the Act's] more egregious and discriminatory provisions"). For an overview of the
congressional debate on the issue of the distrust of Southern federal judges, see Keady & Cochran,
supra note 10, at 751-52 nn.53-58 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Keady & Cochran, supra note 10, at 788 (recommending substantive jurisdiction in
the local district courts over whole of preclearance process because "it is time-indeed long past
time-to invoke the full authority of federal judges throughout the United States in an effort to realize
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scheme of enforcement were created in response to extreme and seemingly
intractable discrimination in election practices. While the importance of
protecting minority voting rights remains undiminished, the assumptions
upon which the Act originally rested should not be above reconsideration.
Because the foregoing review of post-election suits suggests that rather
than protecting minority rights, the lack of substantive jurisdiction in the
local district courts undermines the ability of private plaintiffs to obtain
effective relief under section 5, the role of district court judges should be
reappraised.
It is obvious that federal trial judges in districts covered by section 5
have jurisdiction, along with all federal district courts in the country, to
adjudicate claims under the Fifteenth Amendment and under section 2 of
the Act.63 These same judges are surely appropriate to consider the merits
of section 5 cases where the plaintiff's burden is lighter.64 Furthermore,
this Note suggests that the three-judge district court panel required by the
Allen decision for coverage suits 5 remand the remedial decision to a sin-
gle judge court 6 so that the district court's remedial decision would be
subject to intermediate appellate review, bringing an additional level of
judicial scrutiny to the resolution of the election challenge.
6 7
Finally, it must be stressed that the scheme proposed here does not in-
crease a district court's opportunity to hinder the enforcement of section 5.
District court judges presently resolve challenged elections; this revision
seeks only to increase the accuracy of that decision by allowing district
courts to reach the issue of discrimination. 8 This would facilitate appro-
priate remedies in post-election suits without diminishing the protection of
minority rights.6 9
the fundamental objectives of section 5").
While evidence was presented at the Congressional Hearings on the 1982 Amendments to the Vot-
ing Rights Act that despite progress, vestiges of discrimination remain in voting and registration prac-
tices, see Boyd & Markman, supra note 31, at 1361-63 & n.85, 1372 n.117, the record does not
reveal allegations that federal district judges in covered jurisdictions discriminate against minority
voting rights.
63. See supra note 9 (scope of section 2 action); see also Keady & Cochran, supra note 10, at 751
n.53 (Southern judges decide desegregation and civil rights cases, yet do not have jurisdiction to re-
solve question of discrimination under section 5).
64. If Congress resists revising the local district court's role because it fears unfair treatment of
discrimination suits, it should study these judges' established track records in other cases. In addition,
because the coverage of section 5 has been extended beyond its original Southern boundaries, see
Yoste, Section 5: Growth or Demise of Statutory Voting Rights?, 48 Miss. L.J. 818, 820 n.18 (1977)
("The original provisions pointedly applied to six southern states ... but have since been expanded to
cover discrimination against language minorities ... ."); see also 28 C.F.R. § 51 app. (1987) (com-
plete list of covered jurisdictions), a convenient yardstick exists against which the fairness of post-
election determinations in the South could be measured.
65. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S 544, 559 (1969).
66. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
67. The decisions of three-judge panels of the district courts are subject to direct review by the
Supreme Court, 28 USC § 1253 (1982), while a determination by a single-judge court could be
reviewed by the appropriate court of appeals.
68. See infra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
69. Other commentators have urged more radical revisions than those suggested here. See, e.g.,
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B. The Remedial Procedure
Congress should amend the enforcement provisions of the Voting Rights
Act so that once a district court presented with a section 5 challenge to an
election has determined that the change was one covered by the Act, it
may proceed to determine whether the election process was discrimina-
tory.7 ' Given the burden placed on the court system by suits requiring
three judge panels,71 Congress could provide that the remedial decision in
a post-election suit be remanded to a single judge court. 2 This arrange-
ment would bring the additional benefit of intermediate appellate review,
since the decision of a single judge district court would be appealed to the
appropriate court of appeals.7
Because delay in resolving a challenged election is costly to all parties,
resolution of these suits should be expedited.7' To that end, this Note does
not recommend that local district courts undertake the "complex, expen-
sive and lengthy" evidentiary hearing often entailed by Fifteenth Amend-
ment election discrimination suits in making their remedial decisions."
Rather, Congress could provide for an expedited proceeding in post-
election suits under section 5.76 Such a uniform procedure should resolve
the current disparity of approach and results in these remedial decisions.
Alternatively, plaintiffs could rely on proceedings for expedited review
already available in the federal district courts, such as the procedure for a
preliminary injunction provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.
7
Boyd & Markman, supra note 31, at 781 (recommending nationwide application of section 5, with
responsibility for preclearance process itself given to local district courts); McClellan, supra note 56,
at 77 (suggesting jurisdiction for lower federal district courts over all section 5 litigation, including
preclearance of proposed changes).
70. The coverage suit a plaintiff may bring in a local district court, recognized in Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), while well-established case law, has not been codified by
Congress. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Supp. III 1986). Congress should amend section 5 to include the
private right of action and provide that, in post-election challenges, local district courts should deter-
mine whether or not the election was tainted by discriminatory process. Further suggestions for imple-
menting this amendment are discussed infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
71. See Allen v. Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 561 (1969).
72. Some courts have remanded questions in section 5 challenges to single-judge courts. See, e.g.,
Bond v. White, 508 F.2d 1397, 1400 (5th Cir. 1975) ("This procedural alternative [of remanding to a
single-judge court] minimizes the burden that the three-judge court requirement imposes on the fed-
eral judiciary."); see also Yoste, supra note 64, at 840 & n.161 (district courts have "tak[en] their cue
from ritual exhortations about the burdens inherent in three-judge courts reiterated in Allen, ...
[and] have advocated remanding issues tangential to coverage to single-judge courts").
73. See Allen, 393 U.S. at 561-62 ("[A] direct appeal ... to this Court... depriv[es] us of the
wise and often crucial adjudications of the courts of appeals.").
74. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
75. See Wallace, supra note 31, at 403.
76. See, e.g., Keady & Cochran, supra note 10, at 783 (recommending actual preclearance in
local district court and suggesting priority setting in district court for section 5 actions with a statutory
right of mandamus to insure promptness and an expedited appeal granted as a matter of right to
either party to the litigation).
77. On motion for a preliminary injunction, the court considers whether the injury to plaintiff
that would occur in the absence of the injunction is irreparable. See T. COYNE, RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DIsTRICT CouRTs Rule 65(a), at 695-96 (1987); see also
Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 504 F. Supp. 292, 296 (D.R.I. 1980) ("The decision to
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Because the established standard for the invalidation of an election is egre-
gious discrimination, a court should be able to detect such invalidity
within the scope of a preliminary injunction hearing. In cases of uncer-
tainty, the Rules allow a court to order a full trial on the merits.78
The burden of persuasion should remain on the defendant jurisdiction.
This is consistent with the statute's goal of placing responsibility for com-
pliance on the covered jurisdictions and the Allen Court's goal of encour-
aging minority plaintiff participation.7 9 While it is the responsibility of
the jurisdiction to submit all relevant information and disprove discrimi-
nation in a preclearance determination,8" it is clearly inappropriate to de-
pend on the defendant's presentation alone to inform the district court of
the likelihood of discrimination in a post-election challenge. Instead, the
court could appoint, at the initiation of the coverage suit, a special master
to study the circumstances of the election and, if a coverage violation were
found, to present findings to the court regarding any discriminatory im-
pact on the election."
While this proposal does not contemplate an exhaustive study of the
procedure and its effects on the election, egregious cases of discrimination
warranting invalidation should be discovered by the district court's investi-
gation. Intentional discrimination could be considered evidence of "egre-
issue a preliminary injunction traditionally rests upon an examination of four factors: 1) the likelihood
Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm; 2) the balance of this harm with the harm Defendants will
suffer if they are enjoined; 3) the probability Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits; and 4) the public's
interest in issuing an injunction."), rev'd on other grounds, 659 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982). The temporary injunction procedure would facilitate the expedited resolu-
tion of a challenged election in which the district court considers the substantive validity of the
election.
Orders granting temporary injunctions must set forth specific reasons for granting the order and the
acts sought to be restrained. FED. R. Ctv. P. 65(d). Thus, the resolution of election challenges under
section 5 could be monitored by those concerned with the fairness of local district courts.
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2) (consolidation of hearing with trial on the merits). A full trial
would not bring considerable, if any, time savings over the certification procedure, but certification
was also criticized for failing to give the court appropriate substantive information. See supra notes
54-57 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, judicial review would still bring the advantage of ena-
bling the court to issue an equitable remedy fully informed of the merits of the violation.
79. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 559-60 (1969).
80. See MacCoon, supra note 38, at 124 (important that defendant bear burden of proof in sec-
tion 5 actions); see also supra note 43.
81. The special master could work with the plaintiff in preparing a report in order to incorporate
the plaintiff's perceptions of discrimination in the election.
Federal courts have authority to appoint special masters under Rules 53 and 70 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the inherent power of courts. Rule 53 gives courts the authority to
appoint trial-stage special masters, while Rule 70 refers to the appointment of "some other person" to
perform specific acts on behalf of a party. See Levine, The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial
Special Masters in Federal Institutional Reform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C. DA-
vts L. REv. 753, 756 (1984). Rule 53(a) grants courts the power to appoint special masters in any
pending action, and allows special masters to make accountings or assist in fact-finding, to hold hear-
ings, and to compel testimony and the production of documents. See id. at 758.
A special master is generally "an experienced private attorney, a retired judge or a law professor or
other professional to whom a federal court delegates frontline responsibility on a pro hoc vice basis."
Id., at 754 n.4. For examples of the appointment of special masters pursuant to Rule 53, see id., at
760 n.23.
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gious misconduct" sufficient to call for invalidation, but, as in other dis-
crimination cases, 2 the absence of intent should not stop the court from
overturning an election tainted with substantial constitutional infirmity.
The court's ruling on the validity of the election should have no
preclearance effect;" neither should its decision be subject to review by
the Justice Department. Rather, its remedial decision should be a ruling
on the effects the change has had on the election itself, and appeals should
proceed through the federal court system. Local election officials should be
required to submit the questioned procedure to the Justice Department
for preclearance scrutiny,"4 however, and the district court could retain
continuing jurisdiction over the election challenge to entertain subsequent
motions by the plaintiff based on considerations arising out of the Attor-
ney General's determination.
5
82. See supra note 27 (discussing standard for federal invalidation of state elections); see also
MacCoon, supra note 38, at 126 (noting one standard for invalidation in section 5 cases requires
finding that illegality was "gross, spectacular, and wholly indefensible").
If the court finds that the election was grossly discriminatory, invalidation should be the expected
result. The court should order a new election according to preexisting voting procedures and should
require the jurisdiction to submit the change in procedure, and any proposed alternative, to the Attor-
ney General for approval. See infra note 85.
83. The local district court's inquiry would be for the sole purpose of considering whether the
challenged procedure has a discriminatory purpose or effect that warrants the costs of invalidation. All
changes would still be prospectively enjoined by the local district court, which should order the juris-
diction, to submit the change for Justice Department scrutiny, regardless of the outcome of the private
suit.
84. Mandatory submission of changes giving rise to post-election challenges, although not pres-
ently required, would serve as a backup measure against procedures whose discriminatory effect was
not discovered in the district court. In this way, the revised procedure for handling post-election suits
would provide courts with information crucial to a fair remedial decision without compromising the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Justice Department over the preclearance process or ignoring concerns
that local district courts will treat plaintiffs' claims unfairly, apprehensions discussed supra text ac-
companying notes 58-67.
85. If the submitted change, found discriminatory by the local district court, were to be approved
by the Attorney General, the procedure could be implemented in the next election. This seems a very
unlikely occurrence, since the district court would have found evidence reasonably indicating the pres-
ence of substantial discrimination, and since even indecision regarding a change submitted to the
Attorney General results in an objection. See supra note 16. Nevertheless, since the district court
retains the discretion under this proposal to invalidate an election for egregious misconduct regardless
of discriminatory impact, the complaint could rarely be heard that the district court abused its discre-
tion in invalidating the election. What is intended here is that discrimination be a factor heavily
weighed in, not a condition precedent to, the nullification of an election. Thus, this scheme is careful
not to interfere with the invalidation of any election abridging the constitutional rights of citizens. The
purpose of the approach suggested here is not to avoid the invalidation of elections in general, but only
of those for which the presence of discrimination has not been determined by a court.
If the local district court upheld an election, finding insufficient evidence of discrimination or egre-
gious misconduct to warrant invalidation, but the change were subsequently objected to by the Attor-
ney General, the court, having retained jurisdiction over the election challenge until the Justice De-
partment's decision was rendered, could reconsider the validity of the election in light of the Attorney
General's decision and call a special election if appropriate. See United States v. County Comm'n, 425
F. Supp. 433 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (suggesting similar course of action), affid, 430 U.S. 924 (1977). A
special election would presumably be warranted if the procedure in question affected the outcome of
the election. See MacCoon, supra note 38, at 124 (invalidation should be reserved for situations in
which outcome of election affected by unprecleared change).
While calling a special election under these circumstances is no less disruptive than under the
present scheme, see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (pointing out high costs of invalidation
and insisting such costs not be blindly imposed), this Note's goal is still accomplished: The court
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C. Advantages of the Proposed Revision
This Note's proposal offers several advantages over the present proce-
dure for resolving post-election challenges. Most importantly, the local
district court's remedial decision will be informed by a factual finding re-
garding the existence of discrimination. This will avoid the blind imposi-
tion of the costly invalidation remedy or the inadvertent approval of dis-
criminatory elections. 8 Because submission to the Attorney General of all
procedures giving rise to a post-election suit will be mandatory, there
should be no loss of uniformity in procedures receiving ultimate approval,
and such double scrutiny should identify virtually all discriminatory
changes. The local district court's expedited hearing should prove not only
more efficient but also more informative than the "certification" proce-
dure. Allowing district courts to review directly the issue of discrimination
in post-election challenges should increase uniformity in both approach
and result in these suits and insure that remedial orders in section 5 suits
correspond to the underlying violations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The resolution of challenged state and local elections by federal courts
is a delicate proceeding with far-reaching effects on the jurisdiction and
electorate involved. Local district courts hearing election challenges under
section 5 should be neither expected nor allowed to base their remedial
decisions on inadequate substantive information. The goal of section 5 is
to prevent discrimination in elections. Local district courts should be fully
equipped to fulfill that goal.
considers whether discrimination was present in ruling on the validity of the election, aided by a more
uniform and expeditious procedure than the Supreme Court's certification scheme. Also, it is assumed
that the temporary injunction hearing in the local district court would detect most grossly discrimina-
tory situations so that the calling of special elections would be rare.
86. "This revision brings the added benefit of curing the action's susceptibility to politically moti-
vated abuse, see supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing courts' attempts to discourage suits
brought not on grounds of discrimination but for political reasons). There would be little incentive for
a plaintiff to wait until after an election to challenge a previously discovered or inconsequential
change in hopes of overturning an unfavorable result when the change did not affect the outcome of
the election in a discriminatory manner.
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